The emergence of a "second wave" of developing-country multinational enterprises (MNEs) in a variety of industries is one of the characterizing features of globalization. These new MNEs did not delay their internationalisation until they were large, as did most of their predecessors, and often become global as a result of direct firm-to-firm contracting. Many grow large as they internationalise; conversely, they internationalise in order to grow large. This is a striking pattern which, if confirmed, indicates that enterprises from developing countries have pursued distinctive approaches to internationalisation. It is a further interesting hypothesis to investigate to what extent such firms, born as suppliers of established incumbents, have leveraged on their "latecomer" status to accelerate their internationalisation. This paper documents how emerging MNEs may follow quite different patterns to reach, or at least approach, global competitiveness. In particular, it investigates how three latecomer MNEs pursued global growth through accelerated internationalisation combined with strategic and organizational innovation. Haier (China), Mabe (Mexico) and Arçelik (Turkey) emerged as Dragon Multinationals in the large home appliances (so-called "white goods") industry. This is a producer-driven global value chain, characterized by mature technology and rapid delocalization to developing countries, where not only input costs are lower, but demand growth rates are highergiving a decided latecomer advantage to these MNEs.
Introduction
What are the "big questions" in International Business (IB) research? Buckley (2002) initiated a debate on this theme, when he claimed that the research agenda might be running out of steam. He suggested that the IB agenda had moved through three phases in the 20 th century, concentrating on new developments observable in the world of international business itself. There was first a focus on foreign direct investment (FDI) and its determinants; followed by a focus on Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and their rationale and sources of advantage, and since the 1990s a third focus on globalization and its driving influences. Buckley and Ghauri (2004) elaborated on the third topic, suggesting that this might indeed constitute a "big question" that could guide future research. In this paper we take the arguments of Buckley and Ghauri further, and argue that one of the most interesting outcomes of globalization has been the rise of a "second wave" of MNEs from emerging economies, so-called emerging MNEs (EMNEs).
Recent years have indeed seen the rise of a growing number of EMNEs in a variety of industries, from economies as diverse as Brazil, China, Korea, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Turkey. These firms are part of a "second wave" of developing-country MNEs, after the "first wave" documented by such scholars as Kumar and McLeod (1981) , Wells (1983) and Lall (1983) . Secondwave MNEs appear to be driven directly by firm-to-firm contracting in a global setting -as would be expected in an epoch of multiplying global interfirm connections that offer more possibilities for firms (even quite small firms) to be drawn into the global economy. Their contemporary internationalisation (in terms of rising ratios of sales, assets, and employment abroad) may be said to be one of the notable outcomes of globalization: just how EMNEs may utilize the multiple connections of the globalized economy to gain a distinctive advantage vis-à-vis incumbents, remains a topic to be explored in depth.
What are therefore the factors explaining their success? To what extent is the experience of the still few companies from the developing world that have become MNEs useful (replicable) for other firms struggling to move up the value-added and technology ladder? Our study is designed to provide some answers to these questions.
We focus on the EMNEs in the white goods industry -a mature industry where latecomer MNEs might be expected to be able to make their mark through initial
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) contracts leading to internationalisation via various kinds of partnerships. 1 We document the rise of Mabe, Arçelik, and Haier (from Mexico, Turkey, and China, respectively), as successful examples of latecomer firms that managed to upgrade their operations, evolving from the production of simple goods, generally as OEM subcontractors, into new product lines developed through their own design, branding and marketing capabilities. One hypothesis to be explored is that these firms did not delay their internationalisation until they were large, as did most of their predecessor MNEs from North America, Europe or Japan.
Instead, many of the enterprises from developing countries grow large as they internationalise; conversely, they internationalise in order to grow large. This is a striking pattern which, if confirmed, indicates that enterprises from developing countries, both those that are still small and those that are growing large, have pursued distinctive approaches to internationalisation. It is a further interesting hypothesis to investigate to what extent such firms have made use of the interconnected character of 1 "White goods" include washing machines, fridges, dishwashers, ovens, and cookers. Major household appliances used outside the kitchen, such as video and audio systems, are known as "brown goods".
the globalizing economy in order to accelerate their internationalisation, through both acquisition and strategic alliances to acquire new brands, technological assets and other sources of competitive advantage that expand and diversify their competence base. In particular, and to the extent that most current internationalising firms from developing countries were born as suppliers of established incumbents, they may have used their arrival as "latecomers" on the global stage (Hobday 1995) to capture advantages associated with being late, such as the new possibilities for linkage and leverage of knowledge and market access available through globalization.
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We first present the outlines of a framework for understanding EMNEs'
internationalisation process -as grounded in the extensive available literature on FDI and now-incumbent MNEs. We then sketch the main characteristics of the global white goods industry, to highlight how market, technology, and regulation dynamics may be opening up new opportunities for incumbents. A case study approach is used to shed light on the factors explaining the success of the three firms and link such features to the theoretical framework. We conclude with some digressions on the extent to which the experience of these firms is useful (replicable) for other firms struggling to move up the value-added and technology ladder.
We see this study as merely one of many that will have to be conducted, on other industries and with other cases of EMNEs, before the main lines of a new "big question" in IB will be established. But we see these issues as so important, and shedding such interesting light on the wider questions of globalization and industrialization, that we offer the study in the hope that it will indeed spark more interest in this theme and generate a cumulative body of knowledge on the theme.
2 The "latecomer firm" is a resource-poor firm (both in terms of technology and market access) seeking some connections with the technological and business mainstream (Mathews 2002) . For a latecomer perspective on internationalisation of Chinese firms, consistent with our usage, see Child and Rodrigues (2005) .
Internationalisation by emergent MNEs
While the conceptual and theoretical frameworks developed in the IB literature to account for outward FDI and the sustainability of MNEs are well established, the nature of the strategies that these latecomer MNEs have pursued, and their specificity compared to those developed earlier by now-incumbent MNEs, remains a relatively neglected topic (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2000) . The ownership/location/internalization theory is squarely based on the experiences of large, predominantly Anglo-American, successful international firms that can easily find the resources and the capabilities to expand internationally if they wish to do so. Dunning (1981; 1988) brought together the advantages that international firms drew from extending their operations abroad, in terms of three characteristics or sources. There was the potential advantage derived from extending their proprietary assets abroad, such as brands or proprietary technologies, bringing greater fire power to bear on their domestic competitors in host markets (the "ownership" advantage). There was the potential advantage of being able to integrate activities across sectors of the world with very different factor costs and resource costs (the "location" advantage). Finally there were the potential advantages derived from building economies of scale and scope through internalizing activities spread across borders that would otherwise be dispersed between numerous firms (the "internalization" advantage).
As contrasted with the case of the so-called Uppsala school (Petersen and Pedersen 1995) , the path of expansion is slow and incremental, with frequent loops of experimental learning. When they decide to invest overseas, the new breed of MNEs rarely have at hand resources such as proprietary technology, financial capital, brands, and experienced management. Moreover, for EMNEs the luxury of waiting does not seem to exist anymore as protection at home is eroded by market liberalization, time-to-market is reduced, and production runs must increase continuously to control costs. 3 Dunning and other adherents to the OLI framework have sought to adapt it to accommodate striking developments such as the rise of international mergers and acquisitions, the rise of international joint ventures and collaborative alliances, and not least the rise of fast expanding "newcomers" that appear to lack all the trappings traditionally associated with the MNE (Dunning 1995; Rugman and Verbeke 2004) .
Still, the striking feature of internationalisation by latecomer MNEs from emerging economies is that they do not have these OLI advantages to start with. They have to internationalise, in new conditions created by globalization, in order to capture the resources needed. They internationalise in order to build their advantages -a reversal of the traditional perspective. Thus the considerations that apply to international expansion in the pursuit of resources (and customers) not otherwise available can be expected to be quite different from those that apply to expansion which is designed to exploit existing resources.
Utilizing a perspective that focuses on firms' resources in an international setting (Peng 2001) we adopt an approach to internationalisation that views it as an increasing level of integration within the global economy. We also draw on recent studies, centred on the competence-based theory of the firm, which have argued that the nature of the competence creation process has changed. The emergence of international production networks has favoured a closer integration of the process of capability accumulation, so that the internationalisation strategy becomes heavily intertwined with technological and product diversification strategies (Cantwell and Piscitello, 1999) . Analysing how EMNEs master this process can therefore also offer interesting insights into the broader debate on the relationship between corporate diversification and internationalisation.
One interesting facet of the internationalisation of EMNEs is in the way that they use and leverage various kinds of strategic and organizational innovations in order to establish a presence in industrial sectors already heavily populated with world-class competitors. In doing so, they benefit from a narrow window of opportunity available to them as latecomers. Firstly, they all internationalise very rapidly -so accelerated internationalisation is a distinctive feature that calls for analysis. Secondly, they have been able to achieve this accelerated internationalisation not through technological innovation, but through organizational innovations that are well adapted to the circumstances of the emergent global economy, providing linkages with incumbents in innovative ways. They have been able to implement these approaches through strategic innovations that enable them to exploit their latecomer and peripheral statuses to advantage (Mathews 2002; 2006) . A closely related question is, of course, the sustainability of this process.
Accelerated internationalisation
In both advanced and emerging economies, accelerated internationalisation is a novel feature of the global business economy (Schrader et al. 2001) . Latecomers in particular internationalise very rapidly, by making use of prior international connections, leveraging their own expansion through making use of these -as in the case of expanding abroad as contractor to an existing MNE, or being carried by a global customer into new markets (Andersen et al. 1997) . It was as if these firms executed a "gestalt switch" from domestic to multinational (regional, and in very few cases, global) player -even if their actual pattern of internationalisation is incremental.
Thus they benefit from surprise in creating their global presence, equipped as they usually are with a 'geocentric' management perspective (Perlmutter 1969) . A firm without this "gestalt switch" sees the international economy in terms of adding one foreign country to its domestic market, then another, and another in incremental expansion. In such a process, a "global perspective" emerges only slowly, if at all.
Trade-offs between country operations, and the rotation of product strategies through the most relevant countries, are barely discernible as potential strategies.
Organizational and strategic innovation
Latecomers and newcomers can be expected to adopt a variety of global organizational forms, such as web-like integrated global operations. In most cases they dispense with conventional "international division"-style organization, which demonstrates that they begin their internationalisation already equipped with a global outlook. The effect is that such firms do not tend to suffer from well-known "subsidiary-headquarter" problems of morale and initiative (Andersson and Forsgren 1996) . The counterpart to this local responsiveness is the issue of maintaining global coherence and integration. Mathews (2006) 
Branding
Nowadays, virtually all consumer products sold by developed country retailers are made entirely or to a significant extent in offshore factories located in developing countries (Feenstra 1998; Gereffi and Sturgeon 2004 ). Yet, the development of global value chains assigned firms from developing countries a largely supporting-actor role.
In the modular production network that characterize consumer durables and capital goods, in particular, lead firms concentrate on the creation, penetration, and defence of markets for end products -and increasingly the provision of services to go with them -while manufacturing capacity is shifted out-of-house to globally-operating turn-key suppliers (Sturgeon 2002 
The global white goods sector
We focus on this industry for a number of different reasons. The white goods sector (SIC 363) shows common characteristics with other producer-driven global value chains, although relatively few scholars have analyzed it (e.g., Nichols and Cam 2005 , Paba 1986 , Perona et al. 2001 . Insofar as it is a mature and global industry, we would expect to see the emergence of EMNEs. Products are relatively similar and simple to produce, although assembling different parts and subsystems requires the combination of knowledge domains ranging from mechanics to electronics and plastic moulding (Sobrero and Roberts 2002) . Although environmental and energy savings concerns, as well as the development of wireless technologies and connectivity, are pushing towards convergence with other technologies (domothics), the basic production technology is also mature (Granstand et al. 1992; Ferigotti and Figuereido 2005) . There is therefore strong pressures to delocalize sourcing and assembly to developing countries where not only input costs are lower, but demand growth rates are higher as ownership of major home appliances is strongly correlated to economic development.
A lesson emerging from leading white goods manufacturers is that success depends on firms' internal resources as much as it does on the collective efficiency of the cluster in which they operate and are embedded (Sori 2005 On the other hand, since household appliances are experience goods and reputation matters, brand loyalty is a very important competitive factor in this market (Paba 1986 ). It acts as an information-based barrier to entry, reduces the amplitude of short-run demand shifts and allows firms to experiment (brand reputation cannot be brushed away by a single product innovation failure). For some products, moreover, consumers are still willing to pay higher prices for goods produced in a specific country.
A major recent change in the industry has been the simplification and standardization of production platforms that allow using standard engineering frameworks to which parts can be added or subtracted (Nichols and Cam 2005) . The development of common platforms also allows to speed up product renewal and time to market, which are necessary to avoid price erosion. The introduction of computer aided manufacturing (CAM) and flexible techniques, including just-in-time, have allowed to reduce production costs. These again are technological and organizational innovations of which latecomers, without the prior routines that drag down incumbents, can take advantage, and which help to drive their successful internationalisation. The search for greater efficiency, rather than pure price competition, had a dramatic impact on the plant organization of labor. Flexibility means that a production line can process different models without any special tooling up time or pauses in the production flow. It also implies the minimization of onprocess and finished products stocks. Producers and buyers order more frequently in smaller lots and expect to track their shipments so that they can synchronize deliveries with their own production schedules and with a minimum of warehousing. Again we would expect to see latecomers taking full advantage of such tendencies. China, 1980) Notes: in parenthesis the approximate year when the company entered into the household appliance industry. Sources: Hunger (2003) for the classification, Sori (2005) and company sources.
At the corporate level, the world home appliances industry is still rather fragmented with no single manufacturer commanding more than 10 per cent of the world market. Fragmentation reflects the high incidence of transport costs, persistent differences in consumers' preferences and brand loyalty. The world's top ten manufacturers, ranked by sales, include three US companies, four Japanese ones, and one each from Sweden, Germany, and China (Table 1) . Only a few offer the whole product range and are present in all key markets. In fact, only Whirlpool, General Electric (GE), and AB Electrolux have a global orientation (UNCTAD 2005). Others have a strong regional position or are leaders in specific product niches (often of high quality). While they may not be present on all geographical markets, most manufacturers offer complete or nearly complete lines of major household appliances.
Research methodology
This study employs a case-study approach, in order to generate a depth of findings that would be unavailable initially in a larger quantitative study. The case study is "a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings" (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 534) . The process of building theory from case studies is strikingly iterative. One of its strengths is its likelihood of generating novel theory, but this can also lead to weaknesses. The result can be theory which is very rich in detail, but lacks the simplicity of overall perspective and is narrow and To get around these contractual restrictions and support its internationalisation, Arçelik started investing in the development of its own technology and brand, as well as the acquisition of foreign ones. Significant investment in R&D in the 1990s led to the development of own appliance designs, often resulting in significant cost reduction with respect to the licensed technologies (Root and Quelch 1997) . The strategy is paying off in terms of larger market shares, especially in European countries, which make up 86 per cent of overall international sales.
10 12 We use sales data from Fortune which refer to the 10 companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, including Qingdao Haier Electronics Group and Qingdao Haier Refrigerator. The sales figures consist primarily of refrigerators and air conditioners, while televisions, personal computers, mobile phones and other products are excluded. The company is part of a larger diversified group, reporting sales in excess of US$12 billion and overseas sales of US$1.2 billion. Although these are often mentioned in the press, they are not certified. As other Chinese champions, Haier maintains a close relationship with public sector institutions (Wu and Chen 2001; Deng 2004 (2001) and of an efficient distribution and after sales service network in the region, a factory was opened in Amman, Jordan, to produce both for the regional market and the EU. Finally, Haier has tried to acquire the US third-largest producer of home appliances in June 2005, in collaboration with US private equity investors. Although the timing of the $1.28 billion bid for Maytag was partly imposed by external circumstances -the company was already in negotiations with other interested investors -it proved rather unfortunate to the extent that it coincided with the attempt by another Chinese company, CNOOC, to buy a US oil producer, Unocal. This deal, which did not materialize eventually in the face of strong political resistance, created an environment in which even the purchase of an American company in a mature and hardly high-tech sectors such as appliances was seen as worth the attention of security agencies. Maytag was eventually acquired by Whirlpool.
General features of the cases
How well do Mabe, Arcelik, and Haier fit into the framework of 'second wave' MNEs as discussed above? Pretty well indeed. Since the mid-1990s, these three companies have internationalised through exports, built their own resource capabilities, and rapidly expanded internationally through acquisitions of both brands and production operations, as well as greenfield investments. They have also benefited from the great dynamism of the domestic market, although in a context of trade liberalization and decreasing margins. They have succeeded in seizing opportunities available in the global economy to generate linkages with existing players, initially through OEM contracts, and built rapidly on them to establish their own brands and production facilities around the world.
Accelerated internationalisation
To varying degrees, the three firms under study have used participation in global value chains and OEM arrangements to overcome problems of market intelligence and uncertainty regarding the quality of knowledge potentially available.
These linkages have provided initial involvement in the global economy.
As noted in the milestones documented above, the earliest founded firm under study, Mabe, took the longest to establish itself internationally. Starting with the joint venture with General Electric in 1986, it took Mabe 12 years to expand to seven countries in Central and South America -but it has not expanded as yet beyond its 
Strategic and organizational innovation
The critical starting point for the latecomer is that it is focused on the advantages that can be acquired externally. The three latecomer MNEs have all used resource leveraging innovative strategies to secure access to technologies that would otherwise have been unavailable. Mabe leveraged its knowledge of GE corporate culture to behave like a turnaround specialist at its South American subsidiaries, which in most cases it bought either from GE or from the founding family. Sanyo is Italy to strengthen its relationships with Italian specialized suppliers.
In terms of organizational capabilities, the three case firms adopted numerous innovations that have helped to accelerate their globalization. Arçelik, for example, because of the small size and limited capabilities of many local suppliers, displays a higher degree of vertical integration than might be typical in the appliance industry, manufacturing more of its components in-house. 16 Arçelik has also made the commitment to product quality and innovation a cornerstone of its expansion strategy.
It has introduced a series of quality improvement programs such as Total Quality Management, tripling production with relatively low investment and the same factory floor layout and achieving good ratings from independent test institutes. . 16 The Çayırova plant houses a dedicated tool shop, staffed with 17 CAD/CAM design specialists and 33 operators, serving all other plants, which also contributes to appliance designs. The product development department employs 70 engineers and technicians, some of whom came from Bloomberg (Appliance 2005) . 17 In 1992 management decided to approach Total Quality Management globally and systematically and do its first self-evaluation according to the Malcolm Baldridge model. Systematic total quality operations (6 Sigma) and three-year product guarantees were introduced in 1998, when Arçelik first qualified as a finalist in the National Quality Award.
Mabe too is utilizing the most advanced management techniques to boost its latecomer advantages. It characterizes itself as a "low profile, but pragmatic firm", which implemented a "learning by doing" ("aprendizaje en acción") strategy in searching and chasing opportunities for growth, through rapid organizational changes to better adapt to evolving market conditions. Instead of following an incremental pattern, moving from pure trading to distribution and finally to direct investment, Mabe decided to form a group of managers capable of identifying appropriate targets and then buying and managing them. Adoption of modern ICT and training of personnel is considered a priority and, according to company sources, each worker is entitled to at least three weeks of training per year. Senior management maintains that investment in human resource development is a key driver for rapid growth in foreign markets. In Mabe Andina, 5 per cent of working hours correspond to training and skills acquisition. Similar to Arçelik, Mabe has also invested heavily in after-sales service support as this is seen as a key determinant of purchasing decisions for lowincome groups. Mabe also contracted one of the leading US providers of dynamic value chain management solutions (i2 Technologies) to develop and implement its eBusiness strategy and optimize supply chain management from manufacturing to distribution, marketing, sales and delivery. Serviplus, the product service division, is expanding to provide after-sales support service to customers in all countries where
Mabe products are sold (in the US after-sales support to customers is provided by GE).
Likewise Haier has engaged in global consolidation of its operations, Haier has focused on making every employee a strategic business unit: each employee is an independent profit centre with the responsibility to make profit: (Lin, 2005) .
Haier has an extensive distribution and service network throughout China and uses this to gather data on customers. The company's repairmen, for example, discovered that customers in rural areas used their washing machines not only to launder clothes, but to clean vegetables as well. The repairmen relayed this information to the product managers, who asked engineers to make tweaks to existing products, such as installing wider drain pipes that would not clog with vegetable peels. Haier then affixed large stickers on the modified washers, with instructions on how to wash vegetables safely using the machine. This innovation and others (including a washing machine optimized to make goats' milk cheese) helped Haier to win market leadership in China's rural provinces, while avoiding the cut-throat price wars that plagued the country's appliance industry.
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Building global brands
As we argued before, the governance of the white goods industry presents opportunities and challenges to EMNEs. If mature technology, supply chain fragmentation and differences in the growth rates of domestic markets all sustain the internationalisation of developing country firms, they may still hard to acquire and/or develop brand reputation and consumers' loyalty. Moreover, despite on-going M&As and consolidation, the big players have been in the business for more than 50 years ( Although prima facie sports sponsoring seems a high-return investment in terms of awareness raising, it is a complex and challenging undertaking, often undermined by weaknesses and failures and the impact of which is only likely to be optimal when it is used in conjunction with other marketing communications (Chadwick and Thwaites 2005) . Still, sports sponsoring is a form of leap-frogging insofar as it has certain 'propulsive properties' that enables companies to generate instant attention.
Conclusions
This paper has presented the experience of three latecomer firms which have established themselves as key regional players, in one case with global ambitions. As in the successful cases documented by Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000) , the recipe of their success has been the ability to treat global competition as an opportunity to build capabilities, move into more profitable industry segments, and adopt strategies that • Arçelik has remained relatively focused on white goods, despite leveraging the membership in Turkey's largest diversified conglomerate. Its internationalisation strategy has been two pronged -buying established brands in "old" Europe and adding manufacturing capacity in "new" Europe. It has also invested heavily in manufacturing, organizational excellence, R&D, innovation and quality.
• Haier has built up an impressive variety of product lines and varieties, a choice that can be explained by the fact that China remains a poor country with weak infrastructures and institutions. Vertical integration is therefore an apt strategy to offset the lack of some key markets and associated sunk costs can be better recovered by expanding product range. Although Haier has started investing overseas at an early corporate age, it still relies heavily on foreign components and technology.
• Mabe has made the most of geographical and "psychic" contiguity with the United States, partnering with one of its most celebrated enterprises, General Electric, and building in the process the necessary skills to expand at a later stage beyond the Mexico market and into South America. The key issue here is scale and capacity to rapidly develop new products as demand starts to grow and become more differentiated. Mabe has been able to interpret the Latin American gusto, while at the same time producing stoves to US taste.
The more the world economy becomes interconnected, the greater the pressures on firms to internationalise. Today firms internationalise in order to enhance their competitiveness, such as through attracting global customers. The insights generated are suggestive of trends that make it more plausible to argue that globalization is being driven not just by the giant incumbent firms (Nolan et al. 2002) but also by emerging firms internationalising from the periphery which capture competitive space from incumbents because of their ability to exploit the linkages available through globalization and developing a culture of continual cross-border learning and value-addition (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2000) . The giants are still very much tied to a "home base" and to date have demonstrated little appetite for engaging in truly "global" competition. By contrast, newcomers and latecomers -the MNEs from the developing world -are more likely to be global in their outlook and their strategy and organization. This is giving them rapidly acquired advantages over slower-moving and less-focused incumbents -even in markets that have traditionally been viewed as "global".
What are the implications for other OEM firms which aim to upgrade to OBM status? What lessons can be learned? If firms from emerging, transition, and developing economies are to grow and enhance their profitability, they will need to vie for the role of first-tier suppliers for lead firms, to operate on a global scale, and, in certain instances, to co-locate plants near the facilities of lead assemblers.
Developing research and original design capability can further strengthen competitiveness, enable firms to take responsibility for entire modules, and eventually make a transition to OBM on a regional or global scale. The major risks are related to overstretching, both geographically and functionally, especially in view of the welldocumented difficulties that Japanese and Korean investors have had in the past in operating multi-country production operations (e.g., Encarnation 1999 and Sachwald 2002).
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If the story we tell is accurate, is it also replicable? The white goods sector is a mature industry. Although OECD-based MNEs retain the lead in production and innovation activities, countries and firms from the periphery are increasingly involved in production of appliances, and not merely of their components. Moreover, demand growth is much higher in emerging markets than in industrialized countries. Leaders 22 Industrial relations seem to be another area where cultural differences can become a barrier for latecomer MNEs in more advanced countries. Arçelik lost its bid for Brandt mainly because its industrial plan envisaged a larger scale retrenchment than its rival. At Haier, humiliation and ritual embarrassment grew to a company tradition and technique to boost productivity that managers could not transplant to foreign factories in US and Italy.
in the white goods industry have prospered by achieving economies of scale, better control of distribution channels and rather simple innovation. Facing declining prices, they are re-strategizing, investing heavily in R&D and innovation. 23 Still, in other markets that have traditionally been domestic-oriented, like steel and cement, the peripheral firms are demonstrating how advantages can be secured through globalized operations and service.
As EMNEs now start to invest in other developing countries, the impact of their behaviours on the host economies becomes by itself worth of additional research.
What upwards and downwards linkages do they establish? How effective are they proving as instigators of changes? Is there any notable difference in their behaviours compared to those of traditional OECD MNEs that can back the claim that SouthSouth investment is "development-friendly"? What are the implications for domestic firms in the home country, in terms of adoption of best practice technology and organisation structure? These are interesting, though under researched questions, which we trust will be explored future research by other scholars as well as by ourselves -all contributing to making the emergence of latecomer MNEs one of the challenging "big questions" for IB research.
23 Whirlpool is a case in point ("Creativity Overflowing", Business Week, 8 May 2006) .
